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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: May 8th, 2023

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  • Yep - I think the best strategy is what Richard Stallman suggested in 2005 - don’t give her money under any circumstances.

    I’d suggest not giving the works any form of oxygen; definitely don’t buy the books or watch the movies for money, including on a streaming site that pays royalties, or buy branded merchandise. But also don’t borrow them from a library (libraries use that as a signal to buy more), promote them by talking about them in any kind of positive light, don’t encourage your kids dress up as a character (builds hype and creates demand), use analogies drawn from the books, or otherwise support them.

    As far as books about wizards and educational institutions, Terry Pratchett’s Discworld series is way better anyway - they have more realistic character interactions and social dynamics (despite being a comic fantasy), and it makes for a much better read.





  • Apparently the xitter tweet was a eulogy for Yahya Sinwar.

    Now Yahya Sinwar was a war criminal, so they kind of have a point.

    However, if that is the standard they set, saying anything positive about Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant, Ron Dermer, Aryeh Deri, Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisonkot, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are all also leaders who have supported war crimes should also be grounds for having awards rescinded. But what are the chances that there is a double standard?

    Perhaps a good approach is to check other recipients who are pro-Zionist‡ and see if they have anything praising war criminals, and complain - if there is no similar response, it is clear there is a double standard.

    ‡: And before anyone tries to twist my words as a smear, I define a modern Zionist in the usual way as someone who wants to expand the state of Israel beyond the 1967 boundaries, other than as a one-state solution with the consent of the people of the lands.


  • I think the whole case seems super suss.

    The photos of someone in the area look nothing like him.

    But supposedly they found him days later, based on someone recognising him (from what? he doesn’t even look like the publicly shared suspect photos), and despite him supposedly having travelled a great distance - enough to scatter any evidence over large distances where it would never be recovered, he happened to have a complete set of evidence on him, including a paper “manifesto” and the weapon. That seems like a rather unlikely story. And then they try to seek the death penalty, and double up federal and state.

    I think what happened is the authorities decided they probably would never find the real killer, but it was also unacceptable not to have someone to blame - they’d rather kill an innocent to send a message than let crime against the rich go without a response. So they picked some random they didn’t like and set him up.


  • In Australia, there is a strong presumption towards keeping left as a pedestrian (and overtaking on the right - e.g. etiquette on escalators is to keep left, but if you are walking up the escalator, overtake to the right).

    In some particularly busy places (especially on shared footpath / bike lane zones) there are even arrows on the pavement to ensure tourists know what side to keep to.

    There are always a few people (probably tourists) who don’t follow the local etiquette.


  • to lose 100% of the court cases where they try this defense

    I don’t think the litigants actually know this. The shady characters they are paying for the information probably know that, but represent that it will just work if they do it right.

    Imagine you have some kind of legal problem, and you go to your lawyer, and your lawyer tells you they know what to do that will let you win. You’ll probably do it. Now for the litigants, it is the same thing, except instead of a lawyer, it is some person with an Internet and/or in real life following, who dazzles you with lots of fake formality that aligns to your preconceptions of the legal system based on TV. Of course, it is all just pseudolegal and a scam, but you don’t know that.

    Now you might except that some critical thinking and/or research of authoritative sources like case law, or consulting a real lawyer might let the litigant see that it is a scam, but critical thinking skills are not as common as you might hope, and secondary education in many places doesn’t cover much about the law or how to do legal research.

    Consider that 49.8% of voters in the 2024 US Presidential election voted for Trump, even after seeing the first term. Many people are easily hoodwinked into acting against their own best interests, especially if they are convinced there is a community of other people like them acting the same way (SovCit like groups do have some numbers), that people who endorse those theories get a lot of recognition / are influential (the leaders of the groups can create that impression), and that their theories have a long traditional backing (usually they make up a historical backstory).


  • That catholics should practice confession is a religious belief. But the confidentiality part is from canon law - i.e. in terminology of most other organisations, it is a policy. It is a long-standing policy to punish priests for breaking it, dating back to at least the 12th century, but nonetheless the confidentiality is only a policy within a religious organisation, and not a religious belief.

    Many organisations punish individuals who break their policy. But if an organisation has a policy, and insist that it be followed even when following it is contrary to the law, and would do immense harm to vulnerable individuals, then I think it is fair to call that organisation evil - and to hold them culpable for harm resulting from that policy.

    Even if the confidentiality itself was a core part of the religious belief itself, religious freedom does not generally extend to violating the rights of others, even if the religion demands it. Engaging in violent jihad, for example, is not a protected right even in places where religious freedom cannot be limited, even if the person adheres to a sect that requires it.





  • As an experiment / as a bit of a gag, I tried using Claude 3.7 Sonnet with Cline to write some simple cryptography code in Rust - use ECDHE to establish an ephemeral symmetric key, and then use AES256-GCM (with a counter in the nonce) to encrypt packets from client->server and server->client, using off-the-shelf RustCrypto libraries.

    It got the interface right, but it got some details really wrong:

    • It stored way more information than it needed in the structure tracking state, some of it very sensitive.
    • It repeatedly converted back and forth between byte arrays and the proper types unnecessarily - reducing type safety and making things slower.
    • Instead of using type safe enums it defined integer constants for no good reason.
    • It logged information about failures as variable length strings, creating a possible timing side channel attack.
    • Despite having a 96 bit nonce to work with (-1 bit to identify client->server and server->client), it used a 32 bit integer to represent the sequence number.
    • And it “helpfully” used wrapping_add to increment the 32 sequence number! For those who don’t know much Rust and/or much cryptography: the golden rule of using ciphers like GCM is that you must never ever re-use the same nonce for the same key (otherwise you leak the XOR of the two messages). wrapping_add explicitly means when you get up to the maximum number (and remember, it’s only 32 bits, so there’s only about 4.3 billion numbers) it silently wraps back to 0. The secure implementation would be to explicitly fail if you go past the maximum size for the integer before attempting to encrypt / decrypt - and the smart choice would be to use at least 64 bits.
    • It also rolled its own bespoke hash-based key extension function instead of using HKDF (which was available right there in the library, and callable with far less code than it generated).

    To be fair, I didn’t really expect it to work well. Some kind of security auditor agent that does a pass over all the output might be able to find some of the issues, and pass it back to another agent to correct - which could make vibe coding more secure (to be proven).

    But right now, I’d not put “vibe coded” output into production without someone going over it manually with a fine-toothed comb looking for security and stability issues.


    • Measles estimated case-fatality rate: 1.3%
    • Estimated US population: 346,715,067
    • Measles deaths if everyone in the US got measles: 4,507,295
    • Upper limit on estimated MMR vaccine caused anaphylaxis: 0.000066%
    • Anaphylaxis case-fatality rate: 0.3%
    • Estimated vaccine-caused fatality rate: 1.98 * 10^-7 %
    • Estimate vaccine-caused fatalities avoided by not vaccinating US population: 0.69
    • Net increase in fatalities from switching to measles natural immunity for everyone in the US: 4,507,294

    So it would only be better if he wants an extra 4.5 million Americans to die.




  • The FBI pressured Apple to create an encryption backdoor to bypass their security features

    This was more like a hardware security device backdoor - the key was in a hardware security device, that would only release it after receiving the PIN (without too many wrong attempts). But the hardware accepts signed firmware from Apple - and the firmware decides the rules like when to release the key. So this was effectively a backdoor only for Apple, and the FBI wanted to use it.

    Systems would create a public audit trail whenever a backdoor is used, allowing independent auditors to monitor and report misuse of backdoors.

    This has limits. If there is a trusted central party who makes sure there is an audit log before allowing the backdoor (e.g. the vendor), they could be pressured to allow access without the audit log.

    If it is a non-interactive protocol in a decentralised system, someone can create all the records to prove the audit logs have been created, use the backdoor, but then just delete the audit logs and never submit them to anyone else.

    The only possibility without a trusted central party is an interactive protocol. This could work as: For a message (chat message, cryptocurrency transaction etc…) to be accepted by the other participants, they must submit a zero-knowledge proof that the transaction includes an escrow key divided into 12 parts (such that any 8 of 12 participants can combine their shares to decrypt the key), encrypted with the public keys of 12 enrolled ‘jury’ members - who would need to be selected based on something like the hash of all messages up to that point. The jury members would be secret in that the protocol could be designed so the jury keys are not publicly linked to specific users. The authority could decrypt data by broadcasting a signed audit log requesting decryption of certain data, and jury members would receive credits for submitting a share of the escrow key (encrypted so only the authority could read it) along with a zero-knowledge proof that it is a valid and non-duplicate escrow key. Of course, the person sending the message could jury shop by waiting until the next message will have the desired jury, and only sending it then. But only 8/12 jurors need to be honest. There is also a risk jurors would drop out and not care about credits, or be forced to collude with the authority.

    Cryptographic Enforcement: Technical solutions could ensure that the master key is unusable if certain conditions—such as an invalid warrant or missing audit trail—are not met.

    Without a trusted central party (or trusted hardware playing the same role), this seems like it would require something like Blackbox Obfuscation, which has been proven to be impossible. The best possibility would be an interactive protocol that would need enough people to collude to break it.