Except that’s not the case according to the Flight Simulator 2024 FAQ

For any content you purchased outside of the simulator, the Community Folder will continue to work as it did in MSFS 2020. Any content in your MSFS 2020 Community Folder can simply be copied over to the new MSFS 2024 Community Folder, and the vast majority of that content should work in MSFS 2024. For any content you purchased in the Marketplace in MSFS 2020, that content will show up as owned in the Content Manager (in MSFS 2024 called “My Library”) at launch for you to use in MSFS 2024, and the vast majority of that content should work in MSFS 2024. This availability does not require developers to sign off on their content.

There hasn’t been a packaged release in a while. The repo updated last week, though. Not everything needs a high release cadence.

The most common alternative is probably Bottles

Maybe look in the settings. There is a hotkey option to save the last X amount of time (where X can be customized)

I see you all over this thread and I want to share something you might find interesting.

You keep mentioning the server can’t handle the anti cheat because it needs to trust client data. Here’s an interesting thought: how is client anti cheat supposed to work when it needs to trust input data?

Look up direct memory access cheats. TL;DR Two computers are hooked up such that PC 1 runs the game, PC 2 reads memory from PC 1, and can then output keyboard/mouse inputs, as well as wallhacks/esp. How is the client side anti cheat supposed to know that the keyboard and mouse inputs are legitimate? How is the client side anti cheat to know wallhacks are being used when they are being rendered on an entirely different machine?

As a C# developer on Linux, I wish this was more true than it is. Working on a multi project dotnet solution in VSCode is still far behind Visual Studio / Jetbrains Rider.

Its also worth pointing out that the more you add to VSCode, the slower it becomes. If you add the toolkits to make it compete with Jetbrains products, it isn’t nearly the same lightweight editor anymore.

Won’t speak to Webstorm, but hard disagree when it comes to Rider. VSCode/Zed really fit into an entirely different category from Jetbrains IDE’s. Lightweight editors vs full fat development environments. There are use cases for each.

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90% sure wireguard (the VPN server) is going to need an open port if you want to connect from the outside.

It is and it isn’t. It’s super dependant on use case. They bill on operations, not bandwidth. Obviously if you are hosting video/audio to be streamed, that could mean massive savings.

FWIW: I’m running jellyfin and a whole host of other services on a Beelink with an Intel n95 and 8gb of ram. Runs like a champ.

Using Firefox mobile, everything works and is mostly performance 🤷‍♂️

The OP ruled out zig and rust already

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im a big fan of the nas device being single purpose. its life should only exist in fileserving. i have several redundant nas devices and then a big ol app server.

This is the way. Except my “big ol’ app server” is an n95 mini pc that sips power.

Because even if an attacker could gain access even as root he cannot modify system files.

Your comment was already from the position of if an attacker could gain root access. My responses were to that directly, and nothing else.

Your comment also contained

The filesystem itself is also read-only.

Which is what led to the further discussion of root making that not so.

I don’t believe that to be the intent of the OP’s comment, given their second sentence, but they are welcome to state otherwise. I just don’t want them thinking that an immutable distribution gives them some kind of bulletproof security that it doesn’t.

While you are correct, any system is compromised if you have root, so isn’t that irrelevant at that point?

The original context for the comment chain was:

Because even if an attacker could gain access even as root he cannot modify system files.

So no, it’s completely relevant.

Someone with root can run ostree admin unlock --hotfix to make /usr writable. Someone with root can also delete all restore points.

It would be strange for them to call it that if it actually means “completely irrelevant from a security perspective”.

See the comment by superkret.

An attacker escaping from a container can’t be system root as Podman runs rootless (without some other exploit or weak password).

That would be true of podman running anywhere, and is not unique to an immutable distribution.

The filesystem itself is also read-only.

You can change that real quick if you have root access.

Because even if an attacker could gain access even as root he cannot modify system files.

They 100% can.